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A long settled common law rule is that courts can enforce only final money judgments from foreign courts.​[1]​ For centuries, the remarkable act of international judicial cooperation that allowed foreign judgment creditors to enforce foreign judgments in another state’s court was restricted to money judgments. The implication of this rule was that equitable remedies like specific performance and injunctions were not enforceable in a foreign court. The judgment creditor had to institute a fresh action and adduce fresh evidence for similar relief in the foreign court; he had to re-litigate the cause of action.

Two reasons can be proffered for the rule. Historically, the proper action for the enforcement of foreign judgments was an action in assumpsit.​[2]​ This common law action required that the defendant owe the plaintiff a sum certain in money. In Sadler v Robins,​[3]​ it was held that ‘the law implies a promise to pay a definite, not an indefinite sum.’​[4]​ At common law the foreign judgment created an implied promise and obligation to pay the judgment sum. It was reasoned that where a competent court had adjudicated a certain sum to be due, a legal obligation arose to pay it, and an action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained.​[5]​  It did not matter where that promise was made or the obligation arose; a man indebted to another in one place is indebted to him in all places.​[6]​

The rule also reflected the common law’s pragmatism. It may have been difficult, and possibly costly, for the enforcing court to make the assessments necessitated by a foreign judgment ordering a party to do an act. The enforcing court may not be seized of the facts upon which the foreign court made the order. As regards money judgments, the common law avoided this difficulty by refusing to investigate the propriety of the foreign proceedings.​[7]​ In contrast, a court enforcing a foreign specific order or injunctions may have to assess the scope of the order; decide whether it was meant to have an extra-territorial reach; assess its potential effect on third parties; and sometimes decide what it actually commands the judgment debtor to do. Enforcement could also entail costly judicial supervision, thus imposing an added strain on judicial resources. These difficult issues are seldom present when enforcing a money judgment. By not enforcing non-money judgments, the common law avoided these difficulties.

With the increasing importance of equitable remedies, such as freezing orders, anti-suit injunctions, and Anton Piller orders, especially for cross-border commercial litigation, the stance of the rule was challenged. Calls were made for its reassessment. International litigation has undergone dramatic changes in recent times. Indeed, scholars have called for a general reassessment of private international law rules to meet these changes.​[8]​ Nowhere could this reassessment of the rule have been better done than in Canada, a country that for the past decade has experienced what is nothing less than a conflicts revolution.​[9]​ After much debate among lower courts​[10]​ and writers,​[11]​ the opportunity came to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc [Pro Swing].​[12]​ 


PRO SWING INC v ELTA GOLF INC

In Pro Swing, the plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, brought an action in the USA against the defendant, an Ontario corporation, for various intellectual property rights violations and unfair competition practices. The USA District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ordered a consent decree that enjoined the defendant from further violations. In 2002, the plaintiff learned that the defendant was violating the decree. The plaintiff instituted proceedings to enforce the consent decree and sought compensation for damages. Although the defendant was served, it did not respond. The court found the defendant to be in contempt, enjoined it from further violations, and ordered it to account to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to enforce the orders in Ontario, Canada. 

A principal argument of the defendant was that since the orders were non-money orders, they were unenforceable under the existing law. The trial court​[13]​ was, however, persuaded that in the light of earlier SCC decisions​[14]​ relaxing the common law rules on the enforcement of foreign judgments, and emphasizing the need for the rules of private international law to respond to the needs of international commerce, the rule against the enforcement of non-money judgments should be relaxed or removed depending on the circumstances of each case. After taking into account the facts that the consent decree was signed by the parties; reflected a settlement between them; by its terms it was intended to have extra-territorial application; and the underlying factual matrix was set out in the settlement agreement, the trial judge held the consent decree and order to account enforceable. On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal​[15]​ found that the decree and order were too uncertain to be enforceable and refused to enforce them. The court cast doubt on the propriety of restricting enforcement to foreign money judgements, and held ‘the time is ripe for a re-examination of the rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign non-money judgments.’​[16]​ 

Pro Swing Inc. appealed to the SCC against this decision. The Justices were unanimous that the common law rule, which limits the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments to only final money judgments, should be changed.​[17]​  To them, such a change required caution and should be done incrementally. It should be accompanied by judicial discretion that enables enforcing courts to consider relevant factors so as to ensure that the structure and integrity of their legal system are not disturbed by the enforcement of non-money judgments. The consideration of comity, which informs the enforcement of money judgments, and international judicial assistance, should equally inform the enforcement of non-money judgments. However, comity does not require enforcing courts to extend greater judicial assistance to foreign litigants than they do to their own litigants.​[18]​ The conditions for recognition and enforcement were expressed generally as follows, the judgment must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be final, and it must be of a nature that the principle of comity requires the domestic court to enforce.​[19]​  Also, in enforcing non-money judgments, there is the need to incorporate the flexibility that infuses equity.​[20]​ Courts when deciding whether to enforce a foreign non-money judgment can exercise the discretion that generally underlies equitable orders.​[21]​

While the SCC was unanimous on the need to change the rule, they were divided on the application of the new law to the specific issue of enforcing the USA judgments. The majority​[22]​ found a number of problems with the judgments. They were concerned about the quasi‑criminal nature of the contempt order in Canadian law.​[23]​ The USA distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt orders. In Canada, a contempt order is a declaration that a party has acted in defiance of a court order. Such defiance incurs criminal sanctions that may include imprisonment.​[24]​ Thus, if the court enforced the USA contempt order, it could potentially expose the respondent to consequences to which they would not be exposed under USA law.​[25]​ There was also public policy concerns with the parts of the contempt order that required the disclosure of information prima facie protected by statute from disclosure.​[26]​ The quasi-criminal nature of the contempt order also meant it fell foul of the common law rule that courts will not enforce a foreign penal order either directly or indirectly.​[27]​ As regards the injunctive relief, the majority were concerned that its territorial scope was uncertain.​[28]​ They found nothing in the consent decree making the settlement a worldwide undertaking. In light of these difficulties, they declined to enforce the judgments.

The dissenting judges​[29]​ disputed the characterisation of the contempt order as quasi-criminal.​[30]​ They held that a distinction between civil and criminal contempt exists in Canada and that there was nothing penal about the contempt order in this case. To them, the contempt order was not penal. It was restitutionary in nature.​[31]​ They were also of the view that orders were sufficiently final and clear so as to be enforceable.​[32]​ They further held that although the contempt order raised some legitimate privacy concerns, it was inappropriate for the appellant to have raised it, for the first time, as an issue in the Supreme Court.​[33]​


SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRO SWING DECISION

The decision in Pro Swing demonstrates the adaptability of the common law, and specifically, the ability of private international law to respond to the needs of society. In Morguard v de Savoye,​[34]​ the SCC emphasised that the rules of modern day private international law should be ground in the need to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across jurisdictions. In Pro Swing Deschamps J noted: ‘Modern-day commercial transactions require prompt reactions and effective remedies. … The law and the justice system are servants of society, not the reverse.’​[35]​ 

The decision to change the rule represents an important addition to the tools needed in fighting many cross-border legal problems. The world is increasingly getting interconnected and interdependent. Globalisation is the defining characteristic of our age. Problems in one jurisdiction easily transcend national boundaries. Violation of intellectual property rights can occur in multiple jurisdictions; transactions on the Internet can affect multiple jurisdictions; by the click of a mouse assets can easily be moved between jurisdictions; and cross-boundary environmental damage is a menace of the present age. 

To meet the challenges brought by these developments, we need effective and expedited international judicial cooperation. An injunction restraining breach of an intellectual property right in the UK should be immediately enforceable in Canada, if the breach originates from Canada. If the cause of justice is not to be defeated, a worldwide freezing order or mareva injunction should be enforceable wherever the defendant has assets. Time is usually of the essence with these remedies. The judgment creditor should be able to immediately bring an action based solely on the foreign judgment. He need not re-litigate the cause. Re-litigation entails delay, additional cost, and potential waste of judicial resources. Under the rule this expedited and cost effective course is closed to the judgment creditor.

The Pro Swing decision represents the first authoritative pronouncement in the common law world to change the rule. However, Canada is not the first country to have considered the issue. Other jurisdictions, through legislation and case law, have looked at it. It is unfortunate that inconsistent with the comparative judicial spirit that usually animates the judgments of the SCC, none of these developments was considered in its Pro Swing judgment. The comparative method would have greatly enriched a judgment of such international significance.​[36]​ If private international law is to develop, and be responsive to changing demands of society, it should not be developed in isolation from comparative jurisprudence that has addressed similar issues.

New Zealand​[37]​ and Australia​[38]​ have legislation for the registration of foreign non-money judgments. In the UK, section 4(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 provides for the enforcement of judgments (money and non-money) from EU member states. Section 18(1)(b) of the Act also provides for the enforcement of non-money judgments from parts of the UK. Law reform institutions in Singapore,​[39]​ South Africa,​[40]​ and USA​[41]​ are also considering legislation on the subject. These are important steps. Hopefully, other common law jurisdictions will consider similar legislation. It is, however, unlikely that these statutes will benefit many judgment creditors since they are usually founded on reciprocity, and ordinarily only few states are designated as beneficiaries. Where the non-money judgment was obtained from a country not designated as one whose judgments are eligible for enforcement under the legislation, the judgment creditor will have to look to the common law for enforcement. It is in this regard that case law supportive of the enforcement of non-money judgments becomes relevant. 

In the Australian case of Davis v Turning Properties Pty Ltd.,​[42]​ one of the principal orders sought by the plaintiff was an order that a world-wide Mareva order made by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas be given full force and effect in the State of New South Wales to enable its enforcement. The court acknowledged that no regulations had been made to give the courts jurisdiction to enforce non-money judgments from designated countries under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991. Nonetheless, it held that it had an inherent jurisdiction to make an order in aid of the enforcement of a foreign judgment in Australia, whether that judgment has yet been obtained or not. Accordingly, it granted a Mareva order to support the Bahamas’ order. Two American cases have also considered the question of enforcing foreign injunctions. They have held against a blanket rule against enforcement of foreign injunction preferring instead a case-by-case assessment of each application.​[43]​ 

The EU has a well-developed regime for the enforcement of foreign non-money judgments amongst its members. The Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters​[44]​ regulates the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Article 32 of the Regulation defines a judgment as “any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State whatever the judgment may be called…” It is not limited to the enforcement of only money judgments. Under article 38 of the Regulation, such a judgment is enforceable upon the application of any interested party. 

Some concerns have been expressed in the cases seeking to enforce non-money judgments under the Regulation. A principal concern has been with judgments given without notice to the judgment debtor.​[45]​ Perhaps no non-money judgment generated more controversy in Europe than the English anti-suit injunction. The grant and enforcement of anti-suit injunctions was also challenged for its extra-territorial reach and perceived interference with the jurisdiction of foreign courts. In Re the Enforcement of an English Anti-Suit Injunction,​[46]​ an attempt to enforce an English anti-suit injunction in Germany provoked a hostile judicial response. The European Court of Justice’s decision that the Regulation precludes anti-suit injunctions means this may no longer be a problem among EU countries.​[47]​ However, English courts still have jurisdiction to grant anti-injunction restraining proceeding in courts of non-EU members.​[48]​ Thus, the concerns with the enforcement of the anti-suit injunction remain in the non-European context.

While the Pro Swing decision is welcomed, we should equally be aware of a number of concerns that have been expressed about enforcing non-money judgments. Unlike money judgments, non-money judgments tend to be invasive of personal rights or actions and may potentially affect third party rights. Their enforcement may raise difficult questions of interpretation, and require supervision by the enforcing court. In addition to the concerns raised in the European jurisprudence above, these aspects of non-money judgment raise other issues worth examining. 

First, is the issue of what law should govern compliance if there is need for supervision. Is it the law of the foreign court or the enforcing court? In Pro Swing the majority noted differences in Canadian and American law on contempt.​[49]​ In Canada, an individual in contempt of court could be committed to jail or incur other criminal liability. Thus, the legal consequences for non-compliance with the American judgment would have been significantly different from non-compliance in America. A corollary of this is the need for the enforcing judge to be familiar with the law of the foreign court to guarantee full compliance.​[50]​ 

In instances where the enforcing court has no remedy comparable to that granted by the foreign court the challenge posed by differences in national law becomes even more significant. In the Scottish case of G v Caledonian Newspapers Ltd.,​[51]​ the petitioners obtained an injunction from the High Court of England against the disclosure of their identity and that of their children. They sought an interim interdict in Scotland replicating the terms of the English injunction relying on section 27(1)(c) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982.  Under Scottish law, no substantive remedy comparable to that given by the English injunction would have been available in the circumstances of the case. However, the court, in the exercise of comity granted an order in terms similar to the English judgment. In the absence of legislation for the enforcement of such judgments, and without the constitutional relationship that exists between England and Scotland, it is debatable whether the Scottish court will enforce such an injunction from a foreign court.

Another issue is whether a legal system should legitimately be made to bear the cost of enforcement on behalf of a foreign court. This is especially so in instances where enforcement will entail supervision. The cost of enforcement may not only be financial. It also entails the appropriate use of judicial resources and time. Generally, courts avoid making orders that will demand high level of supervision, but in appropriate circumstances, the courts are not slow to make such orders.​[52]​ In Pro Swing, the court queried whether it was appropriate for Canadian public funds to be expended in such a manner.​[53]​ 

We should not, however, exaggerate the potential cost of enforcing non-money judgments. Indeed, the enforcement of all judgments entails some cost that, in appropriate circumstances, could be borne by a party to the suit. We should avoid the parochialism that leads one to assume that “foreigners” hold foreign judgments. It is possible to conceive of a citizen or resident litigating in a foreign country and then seeking enforcement of the resulting judgment in his own country. A citizen or resident may sue in a foreign court for various procedural and substantive reasons, including, limitation periods, anticipated remedies, cost of litigation, and availability of witnesses. The nationalistic undertones in the Pro Swing judgment​[54]​ may be a sign that the SCC is gradually succumbing to the criticism that it is not affording enough protection to Canadians sued abroad.​[55]​ If this is the case, it represents a serious, and unfortunate, reversal of the internationalist spirit that has hitherto animated the court’s decisions.​[56]​

A defining characteristic of some non-money judgments is that they are interlocutory, and hence not final judgments. Interlocutory judgments are important for the effective administration of justice. They are indispensable in international litigation. In Pro Swing, the SCC held finality as one of the requirement for the enforcement of non-money judgments.​[57]​ It is important that finality be interpreted within the context of non-money judgments, and not with principles that have been applied to the same requirement for money judgments. McLachlin CJ notes in her dissent, 

Finality demands that a foreign order establish an obligation that is complete and defined.  The obligation need not be final in the sense of being the last possible step in the litigation process.  Even obligations in debt may not be the last step; orders for interest and costs may often follow.  But it must be final in the sense of being fixed and defined.  The enforcing court cannot be asked to add or subtract from the obligation.  The order must be complete and not in need of future elaboration.​[58]​

In Cavell​[59]​ a UK judgment ordered the convening of a meeting in Canada; provided for the location and notice to be given for the meeting; and appointed a chair of the meeting who was to report the results to the court. The orders were made pursuant to an application by Cavell, a UK incorporated company registered in Canada, to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice for approval of a scheme of arrangement under section 425 of the Companies Act 1985. The appellants challenged the recognition of the orders on the ground that they were not final. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to recognise the orders. The court held that in the context of enforcing non-money judgments, the finality requirement should be understood functionally. The finality requirement serves three principal purposes.​[60]​ First, it enables the enforcing court to know precisely what it is agreeing to recognise and enforce. Second, it serves to protect the party against whom the order is enforced from the injustice than can result from future variations of the order. Finally, it removes the risk of undermining public confidence that might arise if the enforcing court recognises and enforces the foreign order only to have changed or even cancelled. Where none of these purposes is undermined by the enforcement of a non-money judgment, its interlocutory nature should not hinder enforcement.

Other issues are worthy of attention. For example, how can the court granting the non-money judgment ensure that the judgment creditor does not enforce it in multiple foreign courts? Multiple enforcement can be oppressive of the judgment debtor. There is also the need to protect the rights of third parties who may be potentially affected by the judgment. Banks, for example, are very agitated about their role and potential liability in aiding the enforcement of freezing orders. In Pro Swing the USA order enjoined Elta Golf Inc to provide all credit card receipts, account receivables and contracts. The majority was concerned that they might contain information belonging to other people whose rights must be protected.​[61]​ These issues suggest the need for circumspection on the part of the court granting the judgment and the enforcing court.  The above concerns and issues should, however, not evolve into impregnable constraints on the enforcement of non-money judgment. This will make the new law nugatory.

A court granting a non-money judgment for which enforcement is contemplated outside should have these issues in mind, and make adequate provisions for it. For example, the English Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide​[62]​ requires that freezing injunctions in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction should normally incorporate wording that enables overseas branches of banks or similar institutions which have offices within the jurisdiction to comply with what they reasonably believe to be their obligations under the laws of the country where the assets are located or under the proper law of the relevant banking or other contract relating to such assets. Indeed, it is customary for the English courts, when granting a worldwide freezing order, to demand an undertaking from the plaintiff not to seek enforcement of the order in a foreign court without the English court’s consent.​[63]​ In Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms,​[64]​ the Court of Appeal sets out eight guidelines (the court refers to them as the Dadourian guidelines) to be applied to the exercise of discretion to grant permission to enforce a worldwide freezing order abroad. The court emphasised that the grant of permission should be just and convenient for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the order and, in addition, that it should not be oppressive to parties to the English proceedings or third parties who may be joined to the foreign proceedings.
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